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1.   Introduction 
 
The problem of how to promote wide-area trade in electricity is a well-known one within individual 
countries. National electricity markets in advanced countries developed over time as initially local, 
vertically integrated distribution companies found that there were substantial cost and quality of 
service advantages to horizontal integration and interconnection between service territories. While 
some countries developed near monopoly generation utilities which made use of a national 
transmission system (e.g. England and Wales and France), other countries did develop (limited, but 
in some cases substantial) trading between continuing regionally vertically integrated utilities (e.g. 
Japan and the United States). The creation of a national or wide area electricity transmission system 
which is centrally dispatched has been key to the promotion of trade in electricity2. Such a system 
physically allows energy from different power stations to be directed towards supplying given 
electrical loads from a common ‘power pool’. 
 
Within countries such electricity trade can be facilitated within a single jurisdiction by the creation of 
a separate transmission system operator or TSO (National Grid in England and Wales) which owns 
and operates the transmission system assets (as transmission owner or TO) and operates the system 
in real time (as system operator or SO). Many jurisdictions follow this model (see Chawla and Pollitt, 
2013). The debate about the Third Energy Package in the European Union focussed significantly on 
the role of the transmission system operator in promoting non-discriminatory access to the 
transmission grid – hence allowing different generating companies and new entrants to the 
generation market to effectively compete with each other to supply final customer demands.  This 
package (2009/72/EC) favoured the creation of an ownership unbundled transmission system 
 
 
1 The authors acknowledge the financial support of the World Bank and the support and advice of Mike Toman 
and Jevgenijs Steinbuks. This paper has also been published as World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
6947. All opinions expressed in the paper are those of the authors alone and should not be taken to represent 
those of the World Bank or any of its employees. 
2 See for example Foreman-Peck and Waterson, 1985, who document the emergence of a national integrated 
transmission system in the England and Wales. 
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operators which only owned and operated national transmission networks. This arrangement was 
thought to minimise conflicts of interest between the system operator and individual generation 
companies within a competitive wholesale electricity market. Within a single country it is possible to 
reorganise the distribution of network asset ownership to better facilitate trade (e.g. the creation of 
RTE in France as a separate transmission company owned by EdF or the reorganisation of the TSO 
TenneT in the Netherlands which acquired the higher voltage lines of distribution companies). 
 
However between jurisdictions with different regulators this is very difficult and unlikely to happen 
easily3. Instead what is needed is the creation of wide area coordination of cross border trade where 
the system operation is separated from the transmission asset ownership. This has been a significant 
issue in the US between states leading to the creation of Independent System Operators (ISOs) or 
Regional Transmission Organisations (RTOs). Under such a model transmission systems can continue 
to be owned by a number of separate and even integrated companies, while it is the role of the 
ISO/RTO to operate the system in real time and to ensure non-discriminatory access to the grid for 
individual generators. The ISO model is gaining considerable attention precisely because the 
ownership of transmission assets does not need to re-organised. The ISO is therefore a useful cross- 
jurisdictional model for facilitating trading of electricity. 
 
Chawla and Pollitt (2013) note the rapid rise in the number of countries exhibiting either of these 
models – TSOs or ISOs - as wholesale power markets have been introduced and vertically integrated 
generation monopolies have been horizontally and vertically unbundled. 
 
The above introduction suggests that there both physical and governance barriers that need to be 
overcome in order to promote trade in electricity across a wider area than was previously the case. 
Clearly physical interconnection is necessary, because without it no electricity can flow across pre- 
existing electrical boundaries. Traditionally countries have been very reluctant to trade electricity 
across borders and hence have limited the construction of transmission lines across borders. This is 
actually unusual in energy. Globally exports of electricity are around 3% of total production, in 
contrast to c.64% for oil and c.31% for gas and c.16% for coal (with the average for all goods and 
services being c.31%)4, suggesting that there may be substantial scope for increased trade in 
electricity across the world. 
 
Where trade does occur, it does so in the context of a governance arrangement that facilities the 
building and use of transmission capacity between areas. Both the TSO and ISO models are capable 
of providing the necessary governance to facilitate trading and indeed often run the associated 
markets which price wholesale power and ancillary services. Such governance arrangements have 
developed over time and often carefully represent the interests of generators (and their customers) 
across the interconnected area in a non-discriminatory way. TSOs and ISOs are two examples of 
institutions which embody non-discriminatory governance arrangements. In each case they received 
support from either national or state governments, to bring them into existence. 
 
This paper will focus on the institutional arrangements for facilitating electricity cooperation. We 
have in mind the application of the lessons in the paper to other regions, such as the South Asia 
 
 
3 Though TenneT did buy an adjacent transmission grid in Northern Germany. We also discuss asset ownership 
changes in Ireland later in this paper. 
4 See IEA and UNCTAD statistics. 
EPRG 1408 
3 
 
 
 
 
Region (SAR), namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. These countries are part of a free trade area – SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area, formed in 
2006). The South Asia Region currently exhibits very little trade in electricity but exhibits significant 
potential for beneficial trade. We will begin by discussing the theory of international trade 
cooperation in electricity, with a view to discussing what preconditions might be important in 
facilitating wide area trading across national borders. Next we will discuss two sets of case studies. 
The first set of case studies focuses on three regional developing country power pools – the 
Southern African Power pool (SAPP), West African Power pool (WAPP) and the Central American 
Power Market (SIEPAC). The second set focuses on three regional power pools in more developed 
countries – PJM in the United States, the Single Electricity Market (SEM) in Ireland and the South 
East Europe market (ECSEE). These cases highlight both the potential and difficulty of having cross- 
jurisdictional power pools. We will then go on to draw key lessons for the South Asian Region (SAR) 
by looking at what aspects of the theory and experience in the earlier sections might be relevant to 
the promotion of electricity trade across borders in this context. We conclude with some suggestions 
for future research. 
 
 
 
 
2.   The theory of cooperation and international trade applied to electricity 
 
 
In thinking about the institutional arrangements that might facilitate increased cross border in trade 
in electricity, it is useful to think about ideal electricity market design and institutions. Hogan (1995) 
suggests that a wholesale pool spot market and an independent system operator should go together. 
This is because short term generator dispatch and short term transmission system operation are 
‘two sides of the same coin’ (Hogan, 1995, p.26). This suggests that power trading should be 
associated with an institution which is also responsible for the operation of the transmission system 
in real time. Hogan (1998) suggests that nodal pricing of the transmission system access is also 
desirable unless the networks are relatively simple. Thus the US Standard Market Design - which 
incorporates these ideas - may be the most sophisticated market design for wide area trading, but it 
may not be necessary for international trade in electricity. 
 
Other designs may work, but the institutional design of markets is undoubtedly important. Stoft 
(1996) correctly predicted (prior to the California electricity crisis of 2001) that the institutional 
conflict between the California ISO and the California Power Exchange might decrease system 
reliability and lead to inefficient dispatch! Efficient market design is also about the participation of the 
demand side in the wholesale electricity market. This is increasing in importance in many of the most 
sophisticated markets, such as PJM and New York (see Walawalkar et al., 2010). For many countries 
demand side response inside their own country might be much cheaper at the margin than expanding 
international imports of power. 
 
A key point about market design is the need for sufficient transmission capacity. Fuasch et al. (2013), 
in their examination of the EU, suggest that cost optimal trading within the EU would require to 76% 
more transmission capacity. It is important to note that transmission capacity is not just required at 
the border to facilitate cross border trading. Loop flows in the electricity system mean that the 
ability to export/import electricity across one transmission link is dependent on the absence of 
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congestion on other transmission lines, which may be internal to one or other country. Without 
sufficient transmission capacity cross border trade is going to be limited. 
 
The degree of sophistication in markets may be limited when moving to cross border markets. 
Brunekreeft et al. (2005) note that locational marginal prices (LMPs) as recommended by Hogan and 
practiced in PJM may be desirable in the EU, but they are unlikely to be politically viable. This may 
explain why the EU has promoted market coupling between national markets and allowing some 
merchant interconnection, rather than LMPs. Perez-Arriaga and Olmos (2005) suggests that the 
problem that LMPs try to solve in the US with 200+ control areas is much less in the EU with 17 to 27 
control areas. Clearly having congestion constraints imposed internationally is difficult to sell to 
national politicians. 
 
International trade is always mutually beneficial under the assumption of costless adjustment of 
factors of production (and the other assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international 
trade). However these assumptions are not clearly satisfied for the electricity sector. While one 
might assume that factors of production in the electricity sector can be moved to other sectors, it is 
not so obvious for electricity intensive industries. They may be dependent on cheap domestic 
power, which if it is exported may necessitate factor allocation adjustment in the wider economy. 
 
International trade may however alter the risk profile around electricity prices. This is a version of 
the ‘energy security’ problem. In theory if two countries begin trading electricity this will normally 
provide some insurance against large shocks to electricity prices. This will be the case where their 
domestic supply/demand risks are either independent or negatively correlated. However clearly 
there will be some imported price volatility and the possibility of a large supply/demand shock in 
one country inducing a large price effect in the other country, which it could have avoided under no- 
trade. 
 
Over time, there is the possibility that dependence on imports of electricity might develop and 
domestic production facilities might close. This could expose an importing country to a hold up 
problem if the other country refuses to export. However, in reality these would seem to be second 
order (and manageable) risks associated with increased trade dependence. It is worth pointing out 
that such energy security risk is two – sided , as the exporting country might become equally 
dependent on the export revenue from electricity sales.5 
 
Trade theory has become increasingly concerned with considering departures from the assumptions 
of the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model. Markusen (1981) showed that if markets were initially 
monopolised a large country opening up to trade might suffer a loss of welfare due to the 
competition from another monopolist in the other country in a two country trade model. However 
Lahiri and Ono (1996) show that this result does not hold if new firms enter. Trade liberalisation 
becomes beneficial again. The general result of Dixit and Norman (1986) emphasises that trade can 
always be made beneficial as long as consumption and income taxes can be used to compensate 
losers within an economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 We discuss the dependence of Bhutan government revenue on electricity export income in the final section. 
This surely makes them a more reliable supplier of electricity than would otherwise by the case. 
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An important question in international trade theory is whether trade worsens the natural 
environment. This might be a concern for electricity trading where exploiting low cost resources 
might involve burning more coal in a low generation cost country. Antweiller et al. (2001) find that 
trade is generally good for the environment. This is because trade effects can be divided into three: 
an increased scale of activity; a composition effect on industrial structure; and an effect in improving 
technology. They find for a sample of sites in 43 countries over the period 1971-96, they find the 
scale effect worsens pollution by 0.25-0.5% for each 1% increase in GDP due to trade, the structure 
effect is neutral and the technology effect reduces pollution by 1.25-1.5%. This gives an overall 
positive effect on the environment due to trade. If wide area trading makes emissions control and the 
spread of low emissions technology more likely, then it is likely to be good for the global 
environment. 
 
It is also important to be clear that where international trading is imposed on top of inefficient 
national arrangements is not always beneficial in theory. De Villemeur and Pineau (2012) model the 
integration of electricity markets in two jurisdictions, one selling at average cost, the other with a 
competitive market and prove that the overall welfare result is worse than under no 
interconnection. According to the theory of the second best we would expect that the price setting 
mechanism in each of the connecting national markets would need to be similar for trade not to 
worsen the initial distortions in the markets. Clearly if one jurisdiction were selling electricity at 
below cost and another at its true (higher cost) the result of the joining of the two markets would 
worsen the impact of the initial price distortion in the jurisdiction with prices below cost. This is 
likely to be a particular problem in some regions with a history of energy subsidies. 
 
Thus, international power pools are simply an example of the opening up to trade of a previously 
non-traded commodity. The initial situation in many developing countries is that there are monopoly 
electricity suppliers in each country each charging below cost in order to stimulate electricity 
intensive economic activity. If trade were to raise prices in one country but not in another that 
would affect the distribution of electricity intensive industry between the two countries. Of course 
this effect is tempered by the fact that commercial and industrial electricity consumers value the 
reliability of electricity supply as well as its price (Oseni and Pollitt, 2013) and hence if trade were to 
improve supply reliability and increase price at the same time in a particular country then it is 
possible that more electricity intensive industry would be attracted to that country. 
 
As noted above, distributional effects are important in considering whether to open up to trade. This 
is particularly true for electricity. First, low electricity price jurisdictions worry that electricity trading 
will raise prices for final consumers while increasing the profitability of electricity producers. If 
ownership of electricity production is concentrated while electricity consumption varies less than 
proportionally with income then electricity trading with higher price regions may be blocked (as is 
the case in some states of the US (by states with cheap coal) and between France (low price) and the 
UK (high price). Similarly in jurisdictions with cheap electricity for large electricity intensive 
industries, there may be a reluctance to export electricity at the expense of the trade dislocation 
caused by a potential reduction in electricity intensive manufacturing exports (e.g. Norway). Finon 
and Romano (2009) suggest that this could be dealt with by a windfall tax on hydro and nuclear 
producers (in the context of European countries), which could then be distributed to domestic 
consumers if necessary. These effects explain why high price jurisdictions are naturally keener on 
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electricity trading with lower price jurisdictions than the other way round (see Joskow, 1997, on the 
United States). 
 
Neary (2007) predicts that trade liberalisation in a particular sector will also lead to low cost firms in 
the country with comparative advantage in a sector taking over the similar high cost firms in the 
other country. This is likely to raise welfare in aggregate, but it raises profitability for producers in 
the low cost country at the expense of consumers generally. Neary predicts merger waves resulting 
from trade liberalisation (subject to capital market liberalisation). Indeed this is clearly what has 
been seen in the electricity sector in Europe. This may not be a problem for the distribution of 
welfare internationally, as long as domestic shareholders can realise the benefit of the merger at the 
time of asset sale, however if there is capital market inefficiency this may not be the case. 
 
International trading of wholesale power is more valuable when the price of power fluctuates 
seasonally or across the day at individual locations due to weather fluctuations (Bahar and Sauvage, 
2013). This means that trade will occur between countries even where their average pre-trade prices 
are the same. The rise of renewable energy in some countries adjacent to each other makes such 
trade more valuable.  However it does put pressure on the physical characteristics of the system. 
Electricity is not a typical arbitraged product, because it has several dimensions of quality including 
voltage and frequency. What is needed is a market operation regime which adequately accounts for 
the need to maintain power quality in the face of energy price fluctuations. A good example of how 
important this is was the incident which occurred on 4th November 2006 when a problem in 
Northern Germany (a ship hitting a power line) caused blackouts in southern Europe (and other 
places). Market integration meant that one of the German system operators created an externality, 
which the Spanish grid operator failed to manage successfully. 
 
Where there are multiple countries seeking to reach an international trading arrangement there may 
be additional negotiation issues. One of the parties may block the agreement in an attempt to 
increase its share of the benefits. If it does so excessively or in a way that may set a precedent for 
other international agreements between the parties this may lead to the agreement not being 
reached. There are obvious ways to handle this using Shapley values which look at the value to the 
coalition of an additional member. However there is a real problem where side payments between 
regions must be made. If these are politically difficult to enforce then this may prevent agreement. 
 
Gately (1974) looks at the benefits from electricity cooperation between three Indian regions – Tamil 
Nadu, Andra Pradesh, Kerela-Mysore (KM). He finds that there are substantial benefits to all three 
regions cooperating in terms of reduced operation costs of their three power systems. However KM 
always has higher costs in any bilaterial or trilateral agreement. The rise in KM’s costs are substantial 
(x3) as it exports its cheap hydro to other states, but costs in aggregate fall by 20%. Gatley shows 
that the order of joining the agreement may influence the value which an individual party can extract 
from agreement. He also notes that states may not just value the reduction in costs, but also care 
about the loss of jobs in the electricity sector as in state costs fall. The question for market 
arrangements put in place is therefore whether the market allows individual nations to capture a fair 
– both in the national and overall sense – of the benefits to the cooperation. This may be a particular 
problem where a transit state which hosts a transmission line does not actually import or export 
much electricity from it. Compensating this state fairly for its participating in the international 
agreement may be subject to these sorts of issues. 
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Coordination of TSOs in terms of congestion management could bring significant benefits, if done 
under a single system operator. Kunz and Zerralin (2013) analyse congestion costs within Germany 
under the current regime of 4 separate TSOs versus a single German TSO. For a model calibrated to 
2011, they find congestion costs of 30.36m Euros under full coordination versus 179.56m Euros 
under the current approach. They conclude that having four TSOs will become increasingly 
expensive relative to having a single TSO as the amount of intermittent generation continues to 
increase. 
 
Kogut (1988) makes a general point about joint ventures which is relevant to power markets. He 
notes that the pooling of resources in a joint venture (in this case a power market, where the 
participants are countries and their firms) may not be just about transaction cost savings or strategic 
advantages. It may be about the benefits of tacit knowledge transfer. Agreeing to participate in a 
wide area power pool is a good way to learn about other markets and to benchmark against best 
practice for any individual firm, beyond a simple cost benefit comparison against the current 
national arrangements. 
 
Arguably, the most successful international power market in the world is Nord Pool (which includes 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark). Amundsen and Bergman (2007) discuss how prices across 
the area seem to be well integrated and vary according to underlying resource constraints. A 
particularly successful test of the Nord Pool system occurred in 2002-03 when a significant shortage 
of hydro capacity in Norway led to a severe price spike. Amundsen and Bergman (2006) note how 
the market coped well with this supply shock, maintaining political support. They suggest that the 
stakeholders involved understood that allowing market clearing prices to be high encouraged long 
term investment and that associated financial markets (which allowed hedging) also helped. This 
highlights how any international power pool needs to be able to withstand the inevitable stress tests 
that will come. In particular there needs to be confidence in the price determination process and a 
willingness to understand that a supply shock in one country will need to be supported by higher 
wholesale prices in connected markets. Thus temporarily high prices are an important price signal 
and represent a payment for mutual insurance. 
 
An interesting take on trading in electricity markets is the concept of fairness, which may be very 
important in extending international trade in electricity. Dickson and Kalipurakal (1994) suggest that 
the idea that competitive market determined prices are always ‘fair’ is only one of several potential 
concepts of fairness in market transactions. In particular the idea that if there is scarcity, scarcity 
prices should be charged to everyone may be one that is difficult to accept. Interestingly, Dickson and 
Kalipurakal (1994) find that the market traders in the US that they survey are generally happy with 
market determined prices (rather than the alternative of Dual Entitlement where prices go up if costs 
go up and do not go down if costs go down). This may not be true of electricity consumers (or their 
elected representatives) in general of course. 
 
When it comes to the benefits of wide area markets there is a lot of concern about the exercise of 
market power, particularly if competition policy enforcement is weaker internationally than it is 
domestically. In the European Union, which has pan-European competition policy and enforcement, 
this is not a big issue. However in other regions, such as SAR, if the market design gave rise to the 
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exercise of market power this would be an issue. Market monitoring within wide area markets is an 
important activity to ensure that the market is behaving as intended.6 
 
Von der Fehr and Harbord (1998) look at different types of markets which may deviate from the 
perfectly competitive outcome: capacity constrained markets with Bertrand competition; collusive 
oligopolies in repeated games; supply function equilibria; and auction approaches. Clearly there is a 
worry about gaming, especially between countries within regions. Changing the nature of 
competition, by extending the market may change the current behaviour of players within existing 
markets.  Similarly, Neuhoff and Newbery (2005) discuss how the move to integrated markets could 
initially lead to higher prices until enough competition emerges to definitely lower prices.7 
 
There is a question of whether existing independent power producers (IPPs) will individually 
participate in a power market or form a coalition (or merge) to get a higher price. Jia and Yokoyama, 
(2003) use Shapley values to investigate whether an IPP would be better of participating individually 
in a power market or via a coalition. Ferrero et al. (1997) however show theoretically that if power 
pools are big enough selling into them at marginal cost (and participating in a ‘grand coalition’) may 
be better than deviating and not participating in the power market. This modelling suggests that if 
the international power pool is big enough the gains for an individual country to participate may 
become bigger than refusing to participate (the EU Single Electricity Market project, may be a good 
example of this). 
 
Market power is not necessarily limited to incumbent generators in an international power market. 
National system operators may also exercise market power. System operators manage congestion 
on their networks and the transmission constraints behind them represent significant barriers to 
electricity trading, as suggested above (Kumar et al., 2005). However they are under national 
incentive schemes to minimise internal congestion within their control areas. Under international 
trading they may have incentives to shift transmission constraints to international interconnectors to 
reduce constraints within their own country, reducing the benefits of international competition. The 
Swedish transmission system operator was recently subject to anti-trust action by the European 
Commission for doing this within Nord Pool.8 
 
While power markets are good for short term competition and efficiency there is an issue with 
whether they induce optimal long term planning. Kagiannas et al. (2004), note that generation 
expansion planning is evaluated differently if done by several competing firms (or countries), than if 
done by one monopoly firm. They note that the scope for mistakes to be made in aggregate may be 
increased by increasing the number of firms in the market. 
 
In the context of the EU the impact of reducing market power, through more effective competition, 
is potentially very significant. Lise et al. (2006) show that for a simulation of 8 EU countries in 2000 
moving from a situation of strategic competition to perfect competition would reduce profits 
substantially. In their analysis the profits of EdF and Electrabel (the incumbent generators in France 
and Belgium) would fall by one third. 
 
6 See Goldman et al. (2004) who discuss five case studies where market monitoring was important. 
7 This was the initial experience within the England and Wales power pool where competition took 8-10 years 
to fully mature. 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39351, Accessed 31 March 
2014. 
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Hobbs et al. (2005) estimates the benefits of Netherland- Belgium market coupling to Belgian market 
using a transmission-constrained Cournot model. The study projects social surplus improvements on 
the order of 200m €/year, assuming market coupling does not encourage the largest producer in the 
region to switch from price-taking in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due to a perceived diminished 
threat of regulatory intervention. However benefits would be higher if transmission capacity was 
increased to allow the competitive baseline to be achieved. This implies the importance of optimal 
transmission capacity and of the monitoring of the competitive behaviour of market players. 
 
 
 
 
3.   Case studies of cross jurisdictional electricity trading 
 
 
In this section we examine 6 case studies of cross-jurisdictional electricity trading. 
 
We start with two African case studies from Southern Africa and from West Africa. We then look at 
Central American Power System. These developing country case studies indicate both the potential 
for wide area trading across a number of individually small national power markets. We then go on 
look at the evolution of power pools in three more developed jurisdictions. First, PJM, the largest 
and most developed power market in the US. Second, the Single Electricity Market (SEM) in Ireland 
which has integrated the power market in the island of Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. Third, the South East Europe power market which covers a number of countries 
from  Greece  to  Romania,  and  is  part  of  the  Single  European  Electricity  market  project  of  the 
European Union involving the creation of the Energy Community of South East Europe (ECSEE). 
 
In each case we look at the evidence on what happened to facilitate trade, the nature of the trading 
platform, what institutions were set up to support it, the governance of these institutions, the 
practical steps to implementation and the concrete evidence on the benefits of trade. The case 
studies are not all successful and some took many years (more than might be thought necessary) to 
reach fruition. 
 
African Integrated Power Markets 
 
Case A: Southern African Power Pool 
 
The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), established in 1995, is currently the most advanced power 
pool in Africa (see Appendix 1 for details on its size relative to other international power pools). 
SAPP was a product of the efforts aimed at promoting energy development undertaken as part of 
the political goal of regional integration of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
established in 1992. One of the major political and economic forces behind the development of SAPP 
has been South Africa’s yearning to meet future energy demand increase by importing low-cost 
hydropower from its northern neighbours (Economic Consulting Associates (ECA), 2009). The original 
agreements of SAPP were drawn from the bilateral and multilateral agreements already existing 
(prior SAPP) among the member countries. SAPP’s guiding framework was based on 
intergovernmental memorandum of understanding (MOU) that authorised and guaranteed inter- 
utility MOU and operating agreements. Inter-utility memorandum of understanding (IUMOU) deals 
with the issue of ownership and rights among the participants. The Agreement between operating 
members   (ABOM)   defines   the   interaction   between   the   utilities   with   respect   to   operating 
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responsibilities.9   Lastly, the Operating guidelines (OG) set out the arrangement for cost sharing and 
functional responsibilities for plant operations, maintenance and safety rules. 
 
The  highest  governing  body  of  SAPP  is  the  executive  committee  which  comprises  the  chief 
executives of the various power utilities participating in SAPP. The committee receives and refers 
matters such as the requests for membership by non-SADC members and the major policy issues to 
the SADC energy ministers for onward consideration. The management committee which comprises 
officials from the member utilities oversees the running of the SAPP. Four sub-committees, including 
planning, operating, market and environmental sub-committees are responsible to the management 
committee. 
 
The SAPP member states and the interconnected grid are shown in Figure A1. SAPP comprises all 12 
SADC member countries of which nine are operating members whose interconnected grid carries 
about 97% of the power produced by SAPP countries (Economic Consulting Associates (ECA), 2009). 
Coal dominates the fuel mix used for generating electricity and is predominantly abundant in the 
northern South Africa, western Botswana and eastern Zimbabwe. South Africa alone accounts for 
more than 80% of the total energy production in SAPP and hence coal contributes three-quarters of 
the total SAPP generation (Economic Consulting Associates (ECA), 2009). Hydro dominates the 
generation of electricity in the rest of the SADC countries, with power stations being located in the 
Zambezi Basin involving Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi, at Inga in the Congo, in 
central Angola, Northern Namibia and also in Tanzania. Overall, the generation mix in the SAPP 
currently stands at 74.3% coal, 20.1% hydro, 4% nuclear and 1.6% diesel and gas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: The SAPP Interconnected Grid 
 
 
 
Source: (SAPP (Southern African Power Pool), 2013c) 
http://www.sapp.co.zw/docs/SD%20Bulletin,Sept,%202013.pdf 
 
 
9 http://www.intechopen.com/download/get/type/pdfs/id/16031 
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The introduction of SAPP has led to rising investments in capacity building, and at best spurred the 
trading activities between member states. For instance, net capacity of 1,700 MW was added in 
2007, 1,442 MW in 2008 and 1,061 MW in 2012, and the region is expected to have sufficient 
capacity by 2017.10 Bilateral contracts dominate the trading arrangements in SAPP and it often 
accounts for between 90-95% of the energy traded. Bilateral agreements usually cover a period of 1- 
5 years or more. These agreements guarantee the security of supply but are not flexible enough to 
accommodate varying demand profiles and prices (Musaba, 2009). In order to ensure a more 
competitive  electricity  trading  platform,  a  Day  ahead  Market  (DAM)  was  introduced  in  2009. 
Between 2012 and 2013, however only about 6% of energy demand in Day ahead Market was 
traded. 
 
Transmission constraints remain a major issue within SAPP, with the African Development Bank 
funding new feasibility assessments.11 The potential lost wheeling revenue that could have been 
generated in November 2013 alone was estimated at US$316,312 (SAPP (Southern African Power 
Pool), 2013b). In addition only around 20% of desired trades actually took place in 2012. The South 
African utility, Eskom, is the dominant supplier into SAPP, because of its extremely low (potentially 
‘predatory’) prices. In 2008 it was charging just 1.7 US cents/kWh (Economic Consulting Associates 
(ECA), 2009) for its exports. This is well below the cost of new fossil and hydro power and is the 
reason that the potential regional projects originally planned to supply South Africa have so far not 
been accomplished. 
 
Case B: West African Power Pool (WAPP) 
 
Despite its great energy potential, West African region remains among the world’s lowest electric 
power producers. The region accounted for only 9% of the total Africa’s installed capacity and about 
7% of the total electricity generation in the continent in year 2000. Energy access stood at between 
4% (Niger) and 70% (Benin) and it’s per capital electricity consumption (127 kWh) was 3 times less 
than Sub-Saharan Africa’s average (Zakharov, 2003). Established in October 2000, WAPP aims to 
promote energy trades between member countries through the integration of the national power 
systems in order to provide stable, reliable and affordable electricity supply to the citizenry. It 
comprises 14 of the 15 member countries of the regional economic community – Economic 
Community for West African States (ECOWAS).12 WAPP member countries include Benin, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Togo. WAPP, which currently has 26 member utility companies, consists of public 
and private generation, transmission and distribution companies involved in the operation of 
electricity in West Africa. Article of Agreements, as filed with ECOWAS Secretariat upon the 
endorsement of the Meeting of Energy Ministers, set out the objectives of WAPP and its operating 
procedures among the member states. 
 
The General Assembly is the highest decision making body for the WAPP and comprises the 
representatives of all member states. It is responsible for the co-ordination of appropriate measures 
towards the implementation of the principles of the Articles of Agreement, facilitate the 
implementation of programs and projects, review and approve new membership applications, elect 
 
 
10 SAPP (Southern African Power Pool) (2013): Annual Review Reports for Various Years.  www.sapp.co.zw 
11 For example, for the Zimbabwe-Zambia-Botswana–Namibia project (see www.sapp.co.zw). 
12 http://www.ecowapp.org/ 
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the members of the Executive Board, examine and adopt the financial regulations of the structures 
of governance of WAPP, among others. Next to the General Assembly is the Executive Board (EB) 
which, based on the overall policy objectives agreed upon by the General Assembly, has a decision 
making authority to develop and implement initiatives to achieve the mission of the organisation. EB 
directs the activities of all WAPP committees; examines and recommends to the General Assembly, 
the entry, exit and re-entry of members to WAPP Organisation; authorises all major contracts and 
[finance/debts] instruments; sets out the standards and policies of the WAPP Organization and 
penalties for non-compliance, and acts on appeals, among others. 
 
The Organisational Committees of WAPP advise the Executive Board on all matters regarding 
collective policy formulation functions for developing, maintaining and updating common “rules of 
practice” on technical, planning, operational and environmental aspects of WAPP. The committees 
comprise the technical experts selected from WAPP members. The current Organisational 
Committees of WAPP are Engineering and Operating Committee, Strategic Planning Committee, and 
the Finance and Human Resources Committees. 
 
Despite its existence for over a decade, WAPP regional trading activities have been almost non- 
existent. Not until 2012 when WAPP commissioned Mercados (a consulting firm), there were no 
clearly specified trading platforms in WAPP. The few bilateral trading exchanges between member 
countries were outside the regional electric trading system, mostly based on separate and pre- 
existing agreements between the parties. Towards the establishment of a regional electricity market 
by 2015, however, Mercados Energy Market International was employed to design and develop the 
market  models  and  rules  for  power  exchanges  between  WAPP  Member  Utilities  (WAPP  (West 
African  Power  Pool),  2012).  The  final  draft  of  the  document  has  since  been  submitted  (AF- 
MERCADOS EMI (Energy Market International), 2012). Based on the report, the pool’s main trading 
platform would be in the form of long-term contracts and allocation of excess production among 
members. As market develops, however, spot market energy trading such as A Day Ahead utilising 
the remaining transmission capacity in the regional transmission system after allocating all the 
contracts will follow. 
 
Why did it take WAPP nearly a decade and half to come up with its trading frameworks unlike some 
other regional power markets? The main reason was inadequate existing installed capacity and poor 
infrastructures among the member nations. Unlike the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) whose 
installed capacity at inception in 1995 was 48,461 MW (with about 38,000 MW in South Africa 
alone), WAPP had only 9,705MW capacity as at the time it was formally created.13 This low capacity 
and lack of adequate transmission networks made regional trading difficult as member nations could 
not even meet their domestic energy needs, and because majority of them were yet to be 
interconnected. The slow progress in the regional trading in WAPP relative to the development in 
SAPP  underscores  the  importance  of  existing  infrastructural  capacity  in  the  development  and 
progress of market integration. 
 
Recognising the need for quick intervention in infrastructure developments, WAPP declared a state 
of emergency for rapid power infrastructures in its master plan. Building of power plants and 
transmission networks, and perfecting other technicalities required for loads scheduling and power 
trading  were  prioritised  in  WAPP  project  financing,  with  few  investments  on  information, 
 
13 http://www.eia.gov/ 
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transparency and regulation (Pineau, 2008). WAPP master plan was designed by an American 
consulting firm, Nexant, and presented to the funding agency of the project, USAID, and to the 
ECOWAS Secretariat (Nexant, 2004b). In the master plan, WAPP countries were divided into two 
zones, and 14 major priority interconnections were identified (Nexant, 2004a). WAPP Zone A 
comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Togo. Countries in Zone B 
include Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Figure 
B1 illustrates the major interconnection projects in WAPP as of 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1: WAPP Major Interconnection Projects (Source: WAPP website)14 
 
Majority of the priority interconnection projects – which have been supported with funding from the 
World  Bank  -  have  since  been  commissioned  while  some  are  nearing  completion.  With  the 
completion of many of the projects and the near completion state of the others, WAPP is set to have 
an operative regional power exchange by 2015. The roadmap for regional energy trading sets out 
three different development phases, consisting of a transition from bilateral market arrangements 
between neighbouring countries to an open and competitive regional market system. However, how 
the 2015 target for the operation of the regional market will be achieved still remains unclear 
considering the high level of unreliability still facing most of its member countries’ power sectors. 
 
Case C: The Central American Power Market (SIEPAC) 
 
Although Central American countries have witnessed several electricity market reforms, individual 
electricity markets still differ considerably, ranging from vertically integrated to fully unbundled 
wholesale energy markets. Also there are significant differences in the quality of service, and the 
production  and  delivery  efficiency  (Reinstein,  Mateos,  Brugman,  Berman,  &  Johnson,  2011).  In 
 
 
14 http://www.ecowapp.org/?page_id=168 See also Pineau (2008). 
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addition, the power system in each country has faced huge challenges of meeting growing demand 
and high costs of production due to their relatively small size and fragmentation. Apart from poor 
and unreliable energy services often experienced by the countries, the region has struggled to 
achieve cost-competitive energy services (Martin & Posadas, 2012). Thus, establishing a regional 
electricity market was considered a mean for creating a larger market that would enhance efficiency 
and promote competition among power producers. 
 
The Central American Power Market is a product of the cooperation between six Central American 
countries to form a reliable, efficient and affordable energy market. The focus has been on the 
interconnection of the sub-region electric grid for the purpose of reaping economies of scale in 
larger generation as opposed to small production constrained by national boundaries. An important 
interconnection project – the Central American Electrical Interconnection System or SIEPAC15 in 
Spanish – involving 250 KV single circuit transmission line approximately 1,800 km long was launched 
following an initial feasibility study in 1987.16 A treaty was signed in 1996, but the line construction 
was not started until 2006 and was finally completed in 2013. The line connects the member 
countries, linking Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama for easy 
energy exchanges (Figure C1). The project has received significant financial support from multi- 
lateral lenders, with the Inter-American Bank providing 59% of the initial funding. 
 
Figure C1: SIEPAC Project Map and Basic Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tarbuck (2013)17 
 
The region’s electricity market – the Central American Regional Electricity Market (MER) – was 
created after the governments of the six countries have signed and ratified the treaty for its 
establishment in 1998. To support the operations of the market, the regional regulatory commission 
 
 
15 SIEPAC is the acronym for the Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica para los Países de América Central (Central 
American Electrical Interconnection System). 
16 See Economic Consulting Associates (2010). 
17 Emily Tarbuck (2013), ‘Panama: Regional Support Provides Relief from Energy Crisis’, The Argentina 
Independent, May 17 2013, Available at: 
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromlatinamerica/nama-regional-support- 
provides-relief-from-energy-crisis/ 
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CRIE  (Comisión  Regional  de  Interconexión  Eléctrica),  the  regional  system  operator  EOR  (Ente 
Operador Regional), and the company that owns the grid, EPR (Empresa Propietaria de la Red), were 
also  created.  The  MER was  established  as the seventh market, superimposed on the other six 
national markets, with regional regulation which enabled the Regional Operating Agency (EOR) 
perform international transactions of electricity in the region.18 
 
Apart from the Consejo de Electrificación de América Central (the Council for Central American 
Electrification), established in 1985, which provides advice at both national and regional level, MER 
has three distinct institutions set up to support its operation. CRIE (Comisión Regional de 
Interconexión Eléctrica), established in 2002, serves as the regulator for the regional wholesale 
electricity  market.  It  consists  of  six  members,  comprising  one  commissioner  drawn  from  the 
electricity regulatory agency of each member states. The selection of representatives from the 
regulators of various countries was designed to minimise possible inconsistency between national 
and regional regulatory techniques and encourage uniformity in technical and operating procedures. 
The presidency of CRIE is rotated among its members. The regional system operator EOR (Ente 
Operador Regional) is responsible for the coordination of the market operation, including the day 
ahead,   real-time   dispatch,   financial   settlements,   and   dissemination   of   information   through 
designated national system operators. It is also responsible for the formulation of plan for the 
regional generation and transmission networks expansion. Lastly, EPR (Empresa Propietaria de la 
Red) owns and operates the interconnectors connecting the six countries in the region. The 
interconnectors are 75% publicly owned by the utilities and transmission companies in the six 
member states, and 25% private sources, including the Spanish company, ENDESA. 
 
The volumes of energy traded in the Central America regional power market have varied since cross- 
border exchange began and have always been less than 5% of the region’s electricity consumption 
(CASTALIA, 2009). Power exchanges are currently dominated by bilateral contracts between parties. 
The bilateral contracts consist of medium to long-term agreements between parties to inject and 
withdraw energy at specific nodes of the regional transmission network based on the guiding rules 
and regulation (Prada, et al., 2004, Tinoco, 2009). Between 2003 and 2007, these contractual trading 
arrangements accounted for more than 80 percent of cross-border power exchange in the region 
(CASTALIA, 2009). It accounted for 94% and 98% of the regional transactions in 2010 and 2011 
respectively. The contribution of each of the countries differs considerably. In September 2011 for 
instance, while 69% of the cross-border injection was contributed by El Salvador followed by 29% 
from  Guatemala,  Honduras  topped  the  ranks  of  importers  accounting  for  44%  of  the  regional 
bilateral trade withdrawals in the same month. Panama, El Salvador, and Nicaragua imported 36%, 
16% and 4% respectively during that month.19 
 
As highlighted by (CASTALIA, 2009), Central America regional market currently operates three types 
of spot-market transactions, namely financial contracts and two different forms of physical flexible 
contracts. Financial contracts are based on net settlement and have no impact on the dispatch other 
than through bids and offers to the opportunity market. Physical flexible contracts are bids for 
transmission services between two nodes and a maximum price that the bidder is willing to pay. 
Lastly,  the  second  physical  flexible  contracts  allow  buyers  to  substitute  their  own  planned 
 
 
18 http://www.eprsiepac.com/operacion_mer_siepac_transmision_costa_rica.htm 
19 http://www.enteoperador.org/InformesEstadisticosMensuales.jsp 
EPRG 1408 
16 
 
 
 
 
generation with spot market purchases. Despite operating three different spot-market transactions, 
however, spot trading in the region’s market has been very limited, averaged 18% of the region’s 
cross-border power exchange between 2003 and 2007 (CASTALIA, 2009). It peaked only at 26% in 
2007  before maintaining a downward trend accounting for just 5.8% and 1.6% of the regional 
trading volumes in 2010 and 2011 respectively. 
 
Case D: PJM Interconnection20 
 
In the United States there are now four significant interstate electricity trading areas run by 
Independent  System  Operators or  Regional  Transmission Organizations  (MISO,  SPP,  ISO-NE  and 
PJM). These entities are of interest because they do cross traditional ownership boundaries and 
because they have evolved organically and often in competition with each other at their boundaries. 
 
PJM  is  the  oldest,  largest  and  arguably  most  developed.  PJM’s  three  initial  utilities  began 
cooperating in 1927 to form the world’s first power pool in order to save costs. It expanded over 
time becoming an independent organisation in 1997.21   PJM has been expanding over time in terms 
of coverage and in terms of the scope of its activities. In 2012 PJM covered around 61m people, 
62,556 miles of transmission lines, 183 GW of generation capacity across 13 US states plus the 
District of Columbia. The recent history of transmission arrangements in the US is well discussed in 
Joskow (2005), who traces FERC’s attempts to liberalise the electricity sector by promoting ISOs (in 
FERC Order 888) and then RTOs (in FERC Order 2000) and specifically the ISO-RTO model of PJM (in 
Standard Market Design proposals: SMD 2002). 
 
ISOs have been described as the ‘soul of the grid’22  and as the ‘air traffic controllers’23  of the 
electricity system.24 PJM, like the others, undertakes a number of key functions. These include: real 
time physical system operation; ensuring short term reliability; tariff administration and design; 
congestion management; and procurement of ancillary services. It also runs the associated day 
ahead and real time energy, capacity and transmission rights markets. 
 
An interesting feature of the governance structure is that several of the US ISOs, including PJM, have 
fully independent boards where individuals should have no ongoing relationship with market 
participants in the sector25. PJM is run as a not-for-profit organisation, owned by its member 
companies. The Board of Managers is separate from its Members Committee. Board of managers is 
the top management level of the PJM. It comprises 10 members whose responsibility is to ensure 
that PJM fulfils its business and legal and regulatory requirements. In order to ensure impartiality, 
members’ actions are strictly subject to the Code of Conduct guiding the operation of the board. 
 
 
20 This section draws substantially on Pollitt (2012a). 
21   Source:   PJM   website,   http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/pjm-heritage.aspx,  Accessed   28th 
January 2011. 
22 See O’Donnell (2003). 
23 Source: SPP website, Available at  http://www.spp.org/section.asp?pageID=1 Accessed 28 January 2011. 
24 A good general introduction to ISOs is contained in O’Neill et al., (2006). 
25   See: http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/nyisoataglance/board/index.jsp ; 
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Meeting%20Material/Stakeholder/BOD/Corporate%20Gover 
nance%20and%20Strategic%20Planning%20Committee/2011/20110615/20110615%20BOD%20Corporate%20 
Governance%20and%20Strategic%20Planning%20Committee%20Item%2002%20%20Principles%20of%20CG.p 
df 
; http://www.pjm-miso.com/about/board-managers.html. Accessed August 22nd 2011. 
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Next to the PJM Board is the Member Committee which reviews and decides upon any major 
changes and proposals made by committees and user groups. This committee serves as the link 
between the committees and user groups and the board of managers. It advises PJM and makes 
recommendation on all matters relating to secure and dependable operation of PJM, development 
and operation of a standard, competitive and non-discriminatory power market, and ensuring there 
is no undue influence over PJM’s operations by any market participants. 
 
Besides the PJM Board of Managers and the Member Committee, there are two other broad 
committee and groups that are responsible for the operation of the PJM. These include the PJM 
Interconnection committees and groups which are responsible for formulating, developing and 
refining PJM’s rules and regulations, policies and procedures. The second group is the market 
committees. The market committees ensure the administration of an open grid and transparent 
energy market. 
 
Figure D1: Map of PJM showing states and transmission ownership areas covered 
 
 
 
Source: PJM26 
 
The estimates of the gains from the creation of ISO areas (and particularly PJM) are impressive. FERC 
(2004) estimates the benefits of improved market integration facilitated by ISOs in the US is of the 
order $3.8-5.4bn per year. This attributes the benefits of increased generator competition to ISOs. 
This study also suggests that better use of transmission assets and better sharing of reserves might 
be worth around $0.8bn per year (by 2010).  Douglas (2006) estimates that the regional dispatch of 
coal fired power plants, by ISOs, has led to average variable cost savings of 1.5-3%. Mansur and 
White (2009) find significant gains from increased trade in their analysis of one particular expansion 
of PJM in 2004 when 19 Mid-west based utilities joined the PJM area.  These gains were estimated 
at $163m in the first year, against an initial investment cost of $40m. 
 
Case studies E and F:  drawn from the EU Single Electricity Market 
 
The European Union has had a significant regional push towards the creation of a single electricity 
market across the whole the European Union. This has involved a series of Electricity Directives 
aimed at setting common set of rules that national governments must pass into their national 
 
 
26 PJM Transmission Zones map (pjm-zones.pdf), available at: http://www.pjm.com/documents/maps.aspx. 
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legislation. The 1996, 2003 and 2009 directives gradually liberalised national electricity markets and 
facilitated increased cross border trading directly through specific rules encouraging non- 
discriminatory access to interconnector capacity and indirectly through creating consistent national 
market rules which reduced the entry barriers into national markets. The Single European Electricity 
market is part of the European Single Market project (from 1986) which aimed to encourage the 
creation of genuine pan European competition in all sectors by removing all non-tariff barriers to 
trade. The Single Market project encouraged mergers between national companies and cross-entry 
into markets. In traditionally heavily nationally regulated sectors, such as telecoms, electricity, gas 
and transport, the impact of the extension of the single market has been particularly noticeable. 
Progress has been considerable in terms of forcing convergence of national market rules (Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2005 and Pollitt, 2009) but rather slower in causing wholesale electricity price 
convergence across the EU.27 
 
As early as 1988 the European Commission, which oversees competition in the EU identified the 
possibility of the extending the single market from traditionally heavily traded sectors into electricity 
and gas. A key feature of the process that emerged was the encouragement of regional sub markets 
between neighbouring countries where the benefits of cross border trading were clear and where 
interconnection capacity already existed (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Pollitt, 2009). The European 
Commission welcomed this process as it meant that the harmonisation of cross border trading 
platforms and rules could take place organically, in line with the EU’s subsidiarity principle, at a pace 
that national governments were comfortable with. There have been notable successes with 
emergence of a Northwest European trading area initially involving France, Belgium and The 
Netherlands, being extended to include Germany and now UK and Nord Pool. These projects have 
involved coordinated allocation of transmission capacity and coupling of day ahead power markets. 
 
In the next two cases we discuss two manifestations of regional markets within the EU (and its near 
neighbours) which are particularly relevant to the South Asian Region countries. These are the 
creation of the Single Electricity Market in Ireland (SEM) and the Energy Community of South East 
Europe (ECSEE). The Irish market is interesting because of governance structure, while the ECSEE 
market is interesting because of the diverse nature of countries involved. 
 
Case E: The Single Electricity Market (SEM) in Ireland 
 
The island of Ireland was divided into two distinct electricity markets until the creation of the SEM. 
In  Northern  Ireland  there was  a  small market with approximately  0.7m customers  and a  peak 
demand of around 2000 MW, interconnected with both Scotland and with the Republic of Ireland. In 
the Republic of Ireland peak demand is around 5000 MW and there are around 1.8m customers. The 
system has recently been connected to Wales in Great Britain. 
 
Prior to 1975 there was an operational North-South interconnector, rated at 300 MW. Following the 
escalation of the Troubles in Northern Ireland this was targeted by the IRA and remained non- 
operational until 1995 and the acceleration of the Peace Process within Northern Ireland. However 
the benefits of interconnection between the two systems were well understood, in terms of the 
 
27 Zachmann (2008) looked at the convergence of wholesale prices across the EU over the period 2002-06. He 
found that while there was some evidence of convergence, there was less than full convergence even allowing 
for transmission constraints between countries. He concluded that market integration was only ‘partially 
successful’. 
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reduced need for spinning reserve capacity in the island of Ireland, the non-coincident peaks on the 
two systems, leading to differential prices and the different generation mixes within the two systems 
which led to marginal plants alternating between North and South. The emergence of wind as a 
major source of generation across the island of Ireland has also significantly increased the value of 
interconnection. Wind now accounts for 20-25% of energy generation in Northern Ireland and 40% 
in the Republic of Ireland, with the share being much higher than this at certain times. 
 
In 2004 the two utility regulators laid out principles for the establishment of a single wholesale 
electricity market in Ireland which was approved in 2005. The market is claimed to be a world first: 
the first market between sovereign countries to operate with multiple currencies (Northern Ireland 
is in the GBP area, while the Republic of Ireland is in the Euro area). The SEMO sought to deliver a 
larger  market,  transparency,  a  stable  investment  environment,  greater  security  of  supply  and 
greater efficiency.28 
 
The SEM was created on 1 November 2007. The SEM is overseen by the SEM committee (SEMC) 
which has representatives from UREGNI, CER and an independent member. It involves marginal cost 
based bids from all generators in the island. These bids are then aggregated and matched to 
electricity demand to give a single half hourly trading price. There is also a capacity payment. This is 
fixed in total each year as the total required MW forecast by the transmission system owner (which 
is now EirGrid for the whole of Ireland) times the cost of a MW on new peak capacity. This amount is 
then divided up among generators over the year on the basis of their half hourly availability.29 
 
In the event of their being transmission constraints which prevent the winning bidders being 
dispatched in the market constraint payments are made to those forced to generate because 
constraints force losing bidders to generate. The use of marginal cost based bidding is significant 
because research prior to the opening of the market had demonstrated price based bidding would 
have given rise to the ability for some firms to exercise significant market power in the SEM 
(McCarthy, 2005). Short run marginal cost bids with a capacity payment were shown to reduce 
wholesale prices significantly relative to average cost bidding or medium run cost bidding (FitzGerald 
et al., 2005, p.73).  Overall the SEM has been judged to working efficiently (O’Mahony and Denny, 
2013). 
 
Figure E1: Map of all Ireland Electricity System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 See ‘SEMO Success Story’ available at  http://www.ventyx.com 
29 See ‘The SEM Capacity Payment Mechanism and the impact on trade between Ireland and GB’, Presentation 
by John Lawlor, 19 June 2012, available at 
www.elforsk.se/.../Market%20Design/seminars/CapacityMarkets/9_ESB.pdf 
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Source: Eirgrid30 
 
One important feature of SEM is that it is designed in a way that strategically mitigates participants’ 
abuse of market power. The pool imposes Directed Contracts on generators with significant market 
power,  and  enforces a  licence  condition on  generators to strictly  adhere  to a  bidding code of 
practice. Generators viewed as possessing substantial market share are compelled to enter into 
forward contracts with suppliers for a specified volume at a pre-determined price. This is done to 
prevent those generators from withholding capacity for the purpose of influencing the market price 
(Conlon,  2009).  In  addition,  the  pool  has  a  Market  Monitoring  Unit  (MMU)  which  constantly 
monitors  participants’  bidding  behaviour  in  order  to  ensure  participants’  compliances  with  the 
market rules. 
 
Nera Economic Consulting (2006) conducted a cost-benefit Analysis of SEM over a period of 10 years 
covering 2005-2016. The estimates also show that the majority (NPV €127Mn out of €155m) of the 
social net benefit of SEM implementation goes to consumers, with a fairly even split between NI and 
ROI consumers. The SEM is increasingly integrated with the market in Great Britain. The East-West 
interconnector between Dublin and North Wales opened in 2012, having received a grant from the 
European Commission and project finance from the European Investment Bank. It is estimated to 
bring annual benefits of 66m Euros at an NPV cost of 395m Euros, making it extremely worthwhile 
(see de Nooij, 2011). 
 
Case F. The Energy Community of South East Europe (ECSEE)31 
 
 
 
 
 
30 All Island Transmission Map (All-Island TransmissionMap.pdf). Available at: 
http://www.eirgrid.com/transmission/transmissionsysteminformation/ 
 
31 The section draws on Pollitt (2009). 
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In 2005 nine South East Europe (SEE) countries - Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
UNMIK (Kosovo), FYROM (Macedonia), Montenegro, Romania and Serbia32 - signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (acquis communitaire) with the EU to form the Energy Community of South East 
Europe, ECSEE. The MOU can be seen as an effort to get back to the roots of the EU in the European 
Coal and Steel Community, ECSE (see Dietz et al., 2007; 2009)). In May 2007 the ownership of the EU 
transferred ‘ownership’ of ECSEE to its member countries. 
 
There has been some significant progress towards electricity market integration (see Vailati, 2009) in 
ECSEE. An inter-TSO compensation mechanism has been implemented for cross border power 
transfers. The TSOs conducted trials of a coordination mechanism in 2008-10 and have now moved 
on setting up an office to coordinate auctions of transmission capacity (the CAO). This is notable 
given   that   Kristiansen   (2007)   observed   that   the   previous   transmission   capacity   allocation 
mechanisms existing across the ECSEE region were different and often bilateral between countries 
and that these were barriers to trade across the ECSEE.  However so far there has been no impact on 
investment in extra transmission capacity. 
 
Figure F1: Map of ECSEE (as of 2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Busz (2007, slide 4).33 
 
There is long history of regional electricity trading in general between ECSEE countries, though 
several were involved in the Balkan wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia. These wars redefined 
the country boundaries and caused substantial damage to the electricity network which existed in 
Yugoslavia prior to its break up. The Yugoslavian region was a significant transit route between the 
 
 
32 Of these countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Greece and Slovenia are members of the European Union and 
are subject to EU Electricity directives on the creation of the Single European Electricity market. The rest are 
actual or potential candidate countries for EU membership which would imply that compliance with the EU 
Electricity directives would a necessary part of any formal accession process. 
33 Busz, H. (2007). The Energy Community of South East Europe. 4TH Poverty Reduction Strategies Forum, 
Athens, 26-27 June. Available at: siteresources.worldbank.org/PGLP/Resources/Busz.pdf 
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larger markets to the north, especially Bulgaria and Romania, connecting Greece with the rest of 
Europe. 
 
However the problems in delivering electricity integration benefits to society are not to be 
underestimated. This may be particularly true of the smaller ECSEE countries. For small countries, 
where the scope for national competition may be limited and managerial expertise is scarce, the 
benefits of a full reform package may be small in relation to the costs. This should make 
interconnection more attractive but it does imply a potentially problematic loss of sovereignty in a 
region where this is an important issue. Thus, without adequate interconnection wholesale 
competition may therefore be an issue within some ECSEE countries (e.g. Albania, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, UNMIK, FYROM and Montenegro). 
 
The internal decision making in ECSEE rests with a Ministerial Council (MC) and a Permanent High 
Level Group (PHLG). The MC provides general policy guidelines and takes measures to ensure that 
the objectives of ECSEE are met. The body also delegates, when necessary, the Permanent High 
Level Group, the Regulatory Board or the Secretariat to carry out some functions in order to achieve 
the  policy  objectives  of  the  Energy  Community.  The  presidency  of  the  MC  is  rotated  annually 
between contracting parties. The PHLG which is also chaired by a president is responsible for 
preparing the work of the MC, ratifying technical assistance requests made by international donor 
organisations,  international  financial  institutions  and  bilateral  donors,  and  reporting  to  the 
Ministerial Council on progress made toward achieving the ECSEE’s objectives, among others. The 
Regulatory Board provides advice on the details of statutory, technical and regulatory rules to the 
Ministerial Council or the Permanent High Level Group, and issues Recommendations on cross- 
border disputes involving two or more Regulators upon request by any of the parties involved in 
dispute. The President of the Board is elected for a term determined by the Regulatory Board while 
European Commission acts as Vice-President. The Secretariat serves as the administrative hub of 
ECSEE and is headed by a Director appointed by a Procedural Act of the Ministerial Council. 
 
The Energy Community has developed a Coordinated Auction Office (CAO) for an effective regional 
congestion management system. The South East European Coordinated Auction Office (SEE CAO) is 
to  be  responsible  for the harmonization of congestion management  and optimization of cross- 
border capacity allocation. The lack of a regionally coordinated capacity allocation and congestion 
management system creates a barrier for cross-border electricity trade and as a consequence for the 
establishment of regional electricity market in South East Europe. The Office is expected to tackle 
this problem by acting as a central point for cross-border capacity allocation in the region. The 
application of one single set of auction rules and one single allocation platform for the whole region 
by the CAO is expected to result in the full harmonisation of the system. The CAO was expected to 
perform the first round of yearly auctions for 2014 annual capacities (Poyry Management Consulting 
and Nord Pool Consulting, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
4.   Key lessons from the Case Studies 
 
 
This section highlights the lessons learned from the various trading arrangements discussed in this 
paper. We organise these under a number of key headings. 
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Pre-conditions for trade: Trade Agreements/Transmission Availability 
 
 
Both expanded bilateral power trading and more formal power pools require a broader pre- 
commitment to free trade to be successful. 
 
Electricity is just one commodity that could be freely traded across borders. It is not clear that it can 
be traded easily without a prior commitment to the creation of a free trade area. The existence of a 
regional trade can aid regional electricity trading in several ways: the existence of a regional trade 
reduces/removes possible trade barriers to regional power market and reduces planning time as 
most of the rules and regulations necessary for regional trading would have been established. The 
need for specific trade agreements to support electricity trade is heightened by the fact that WTO 
rules do not adequately address trade in electricity, partly because it combines goods (production) 
and services (transmission), and involves other policy objectives to do with the environment and 
energy security.34 
 
Free trade arrangements between countries leads to the establishment of the trust required to 
promote the development of a regional power pool. Five of our case studies are based within 
established free trade areas; the sixth – ECSEE straddles the EU and its near neighbours and is the 
least institutionally developed. All of them are clearly being promoted within a wider trade 
development context. Thus, SAPP is an offshoot of the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) while WAPP is a subsidiary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
The existence of regional trade might be the reason why bilateral power trades always continue to 
thrive even before an advanced power pool is achieved. 
 
Our case studies are consistent with the hypothesis that greater trade openness leads to more cross- 
border trade in electricity, even keeping the potential gains from trade constant. 
 
The existence of a common currency is not a pre-condition for an effective functioning electricity 
market. Although a common monetary unit does help facilitate trade because it signals deep trade 
integration, this is not necessary and fully functioning cross border electricity markets can exist in 
the presence of multiple currencies – the Single Electricity Market (SEM) in Ireland is a good example 
here. Similarly, SAPP members do not have a common currency. 
 
Similarly, it should be pointed out that institutions of competition policy enforcement across a free 
trade area are not necessary for power pools to develop and function effectively (they don’t exist for 
the SAPP or SIEPAC countries). However, such institutions are a sign of deep trade integration – and 
exist in the US and in the EU – and do act as regulators of mergers and market power in cross 
jurisdictional power pools (such as PJM, Nord Pool and SEM). 
 
Fuel costs may be reflected more quickly in power prices in an international power market, than in a 
managed national market. This is economically efficient but does expose wholesale electricity price 
dependent customers to significant variability in prices. PJM is a good example of this. PJM note that 
average real time prices rose 24% in 2010 and fell 25% in 2012.35 Modelling would expose whether 
 
34 For a discussion see: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr10_forum_e/wtr10_7may10_e.htm 
35 ‘PJM The Cost of Electricity’, PJM website. 
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such volatility is likely to be higher or lower with an integrated market. Such market risks may have 
implications for the willingness of jurisdictions to be involved in cross-border trading of electricity or 
their need for institutional arrangements which help mitigate risks. 
 
It almost goes without saying that for trade to occur, there must be a no trade price differential 
between the potential parties to the trade. This implies that there must be a relatively low electricity 
price country, where the unit value of electricity exports to the relatively high price country is 
greater than the willingness to pay for a unit electricity consumption within the country. In many 
countries of WAPP this is not the case, in the sense that the price an importing country would be 
willing to pay for a kWh is less than the willingness to pay of demand for a kWh within the potential 
exporting country. This could be case for a country with a lot of un-served load and underdeveloped 
hydro  capacity.  In  theory  this  country  should  be  exporting,  but  only  after  satisfying  its  latent 
domestic demand. This fact may explain the slowness of the development of international 
interconnection from countries with favourable export potential. 
 
Adequate transmission capacity is essential for a power trading to occur.  Thus, agreements for 
expanding transmission capacity are integral to the development of an international power pool. 
 
A generalised commitment to free trade is not enough to promote the development of a fully 
functioning cross-jurisdictional power pool, with a single market price. This would seem to require 
physical investment in sufficient cross-border transmission capacity. SEM only came about after the 
re-energising  of  the  North-South  interconnector.    The  development  of  WAPP  beyond  bilateral 
trading has been prevented by a lack of transmission capacity. Lack of transmission capacity has not 
prevented the emergence of spot markets in SIEPAC or SAPP but has severely limited their 
significance and explains the prolonged dominance of bilateral trading. By contrast in developed 
regional power pools such as PJM or Nord Pool there has been a significant amount of transmission 
capacity which has supported the development of significant power pools. While our case studies 
suggest power markets can come before the development of interconnection (e.g. in the case 
SIEPAC), they can only be significant in the presence of sufficient interconnection. 
 
The development of sufficient transmission capacity is a problem within all power systems. This is 
because  there  almost  always  practical  and  political  problems  in  allocating  the  gains  from 
transmission  capacity  expansion.  This  explains  why  in  national  power  systems  transmission 
expansion costs were historically socialised across the whole of society (e.g. within the CEGB in 
England and Wales, or within US vertically integrated utilities) rather than fully allocated to specific 
sets of customers and generators, via locational charging. Thus it is easy to understand the difficulty 
in getting agreements to allocate the costs of interconnecting transmission between jurisdictions. 
 
However  ‘cross  border’  investments  in  transmission  capacity  did  occur  to  a  limited  extent 
historically where there were sufficiently large bilateral gains relative to the cost of transmission 
expansion (i.e. large price differentials which can be arbitraged by relatively short distance wires). 
This explains the existence of some transmission capacity between jurisdictions within all of our case 
studies, prior to their most recent institutional incarnation. However the expansion of this initial 
transmission capacity - to the extent that it has occurred – has been supported by feasibility studies 
which have attracted multilateral agency finance. SIEPAC, WAPP, SAPP have all been financed by 
international development agencies (IADB, World Bank and AfDB); while the EU has financially 
supported interconnection projects in the SEM and ECSEE. 
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Institutional Arrangements 
 
The role of strong, efficient and independent institutions in ensuring an effective functioning 
integrated power market cannot be over-emphasised. 
 
An integrated power pool needs an efficient operator who can oversee and sanction the activities of 
participants in order to prevent predatory pricing, non-disclosure of capacity, and other forms of 
unruly behaviour. Cross-border institutional arrangements are essential, but can take a variety of 
forms. WAPP and SAPP are international arrangements for electricity exchanges. PJM is an actual 
cross-jurisdictional ISO. The ECSEE has evolved a joint institution for allocating cross border 
transmission capacity, separate from the national system operators. While the strength of the 
institutional arrangements governing cross-border trading is undoubtedly limited if it is cross border, 
it clearly is possible to build strong cross-border power markets (as demonstrated by SEM and 
SIEPAC). The SEM has involved the merger of the system operators in both participating jurisdictions 
(though they still continue to exist separately). This is helped where the parties to the transaction 
are private entities and can submit themselves to be bound by a common legal system. Indeed the 
problem is not the lack of a common legal system to which all the parties can be bound, but the 
unwillingness of sovereign countries to bind themselves to a common enforcement mechanism. 
Such institutions do involve some additional cost (as Mansur and White, 2009, found for PJM) but 
these are likely to be small in relation to the benefits. 
 
Getting the appropriate combination of regulation and market design for power pools is important. 
 
While a new cross border regulatory agency is not necessary some regulatory oversight is beneficial. 
SAPP could have benefited from some regulation of Eskom’s potentially predatory pricing behaviour. 
The SIEPAC, PJM, SEM and ECSEE are subject to some form of external regulatory oversight. PJM is 
clearly the most developed as it is subject to oversight from the US national energy regulator, FERC. 
Cross-border electricity markets within the EU are subject to the jurisdiction of the European 
Commission, which regulates EU wide competition. Market design may be important for reducing 
the need for cross-border regulatory enforcement action. For instance, in small markets such as 
Ireland price based bidding would have involved large distributional transfers and potentially 
significant welfare losses. Hence the introduction of cost based bidding with a capacity market in the 
SEM. The price determination process should both be based on underlying economic cost and take 
account of the potential for market power and the existing pricing inefficiencies within the trade 
partners. Clearly disputes about price determination are potentially more difficult to resolve in a 
cross-border market than in a national market and hence should be avoided. 
 
Countries may have rational reasons to wish to mitigate the price risks associated with electricity 
market integration. Small countries faced with increasing their exposure to foreign sources of 
electricity  price volatility  may  be  unwilling  to  have  much  exposure  to  short  term  international 
market prices and prefer most trades to occur under long term contracts at fixed prices. This may 
explain the lack of trading in the DAM market of SAPP and the preference for bilateral contracting in 
SAPP and SIEPAC. Clearly as long as the price determination process for long term contracts is 
reasonably efficient then this may not be a problem and the market should decide the mix of 
contract terms under which electricity is exchanged. 
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The use of day-ahead markets and/or real time markets facilitates more trade and greater market 
efficiency. 
 
Day-Ahead/real  time  trading  leads  to  more  competition  than  in  bilateral  arrangements  and 
therefore results in more efficient utilisation of resources. The bidding mechanism in day ahead/real 
time market tends to make suppliers to be more efficient in order to keep their marginal costs as low 
as possible since they can be bid out of trade/market if they bid too high price. A day ahead/real 
time market also is more flexible and does more to facilitate trade than bilateral arrangements 
alone. This seems to be in line with the experience of SIEPAC (where most trade is bilateral) vs the 
SEM in Ireland (where there is a compulsory day ahead pool). 
 
Timeline/Process of how to get there 
 
The creation of cross border trading capacity often has the effect of inducing further market 
integration. 
 
Trade success demonstrates the concept of trade being mutually beneficial. Several of our examples 
show that initial trading arrangements have expanded over time to include more jurisdictions, 
building on the initial cooperating group. This is true of PJM (extending from 3 utilities) and SEM 
(which is extending its transmission capacity and increasingly integrating with the GB market). 
 
There can and should be a timetable for reform and development. 
 
Developing and keeping to a timetable and is essential for the rapid development of integrated 
power market. It is necessary that agreeing parties design a timetable with clear objectives and the 
procedures or  processes required  to  get there.  This  would allow  them  to  keep  tracks  of  their 
progress as well as having a definite focus. In each of our jurisdictions a timeline of development can 
be identified. The setting of a clear timetable in the case of the SEM and ECSEE seems to have been 
successful in reaching the next stage of development in the market. 
 
There can be an important role for international organisations to facilitate the creation of power 
pools. 
 
The creation of a regional power pool requires substantial investments in building and updating 
generation capacity, transmission networks, and human development. All five of the international 
power markets we look at have received significant external development support and financing 
(from the AfDB, IADB and the EU). The support levels are significant (59% of the funding for SIEPAC 
came from the IADB). Thus, the evidence is that the support of international organisations or foreign 
capital (as bilateral aid or development finance) is required. 
 
In SAPP the gap between bids and actual traded volumes in DAM are always due to transmission 
constraints. Similarly, the slow development of trading in the WAPP are caused by lack of adequate 
funding required to embark on massive infrastructural developments necessary for effective trading 
arrangements, although they do receive foreign support. Things probably would have been better if 
an international organisation had fully charge of the creation and development of the WAPP for a 
possible hand-over to the member countries at a later date. 
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Clearly sovereign countries may be reluctant to do this, but the fact is that the SIEPAC and ECSEE 
countries have been willing to do this. The creation of the ECSEE is a particularly good example of 
such initial agreement between an international organisation and the countries, which has now been 
given to the countries. 
 
The viability (or otherwise) of an international power pool should be assessed in advance by a careful 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
Clearly any major policy change should be subject to an impact assessment. This is particularly true 
of electricity markets which lend themselves to modelling and can provide a quantification of likely 
benefits and identify the need for any side payments to countries who facilitate trade but do not 
directly benefit (this was a particular issue in the SIEPAC case). Also, fuel costs may be reflected 
more quickly in power prices in an international power market, than in a managed national market. 
This can expose wholesale electricity price dependent customers to significant variability in prices. 
Modelling would expose whether such volatility is likely to be higher or lower with an integrated 
market. 
 
Power pools can (and should) start with a small number of countries and grow over time. 
 
The US and EU experience also suggests that regional power markets – involving just 2 or 3 parties - 
might be a good place to start on the road to full market integration. SEM involves 2 countries, PJM 
started with 3 utilities. Nord Pool became an international power market by expanding from Norway 
to include Sweden in 1996 (it now covers trades between 9 countries). Indeed, one of the 
observations from our case studies is that the most integrated markets are those that have grown 
organically rather than those that started with a large number of jurisdictions. The slow growth of 
WAPP may be a function of the large number of participating countries – 14 - at the beginning. 
Starting small means that large gains from trading can be demonstrated and new parties willingly 
opt in to an existing working arrangement. This would seem to offer more chance of steady deep 
progress, rather than prolonged initial development periods. 
 
Reasons to be hopeful about the prospects for international power trading in the other regions, such 
as SAR 
 
Trust building around electricity trading is possible even between countries with a history of conflict. 
 
Five of our six case studies are drawn from troubled regions. The nature of the trouble was not 
necessarily at the border but sometimes internal conflict (and hence a potential source of supply risk 
for international partners). However in the case of SAPP and ECSEE there have been cross-border 
conflicts in the past. Often electricity trading by reinforcing mutual interdependence can be a 
significant positive outcome for the conflict resolution process (e.g. SEM and hopefully ECSEE). 
 
The potential gains within the South Asian Region (SAR) from cross-border electricity trade are large. 
 
ESMAP (2008) discusses the nature of the gains from increased energy trading in the SAR. This 
report discusses the bilateral (and multilateral) electricity trades that might be mutually beneficial 
within the region. Of these, six are relevant to our initial list of eight SAR countries: Pakistan-India 
and Pakistan-Afghanistan; Bhutan-India; Nepal-India; Bangladesh-India; India-Sri Lanka; and 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India multilateral trade. 
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The ESMAP report discusses the absence of electricity interconnection between Pakistan and India 
and the difficulties of interconnecting Pakistan with Afghanistan, suggesting that the gains from 
trade are modest. Bhutan-India is the one electricity trade success story in the region, with Bhutan 
deriving significant government revenue from the export of hydro based electricity to India. In 2010 
Bhutan  exported  5.4  TWh  (or  75%  of  its  production)36   to  India.    Nepal-India  has  the  biggest 
unexploited  trade  potential.  Nepal  has  43  GW  of  identified  economic  hydro  capacity,  and  an 
installed capacity of just 721 MW in 2010. Much of any hydro capacity could be exported to India, 
but current total exports were 1% of its current production (or 0.03 TWh) in 2010. Bangladesh-India 
electricity trade is also at a very low level in spite of good prospects for the export of gas based 
generation from Bangladesh to India. In 2010 Bangladesh imported a total 0.5 TWh of electricity 
(with zero exports). In spite of considerable under-utilised hydro resources in Sri Lanka and a mere 
30 km of sea to India, there remains no interconnection between the two countries. 
 
In terms of a regional electricity market, there would seem to be a lot of potential for a joint 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India market, aimed at exploiting the considerable hydro potential of 
Bhutan and Nepal. Studies carried out by USAID under its SARI-E program37  identified relative low 
cost transmission investments ($9m to $52m at the time) which would significantly increase cross 
border transmission capacity in the north east border region of India and its three neighbours. 
 
Chattopadhyay (2013) quantitatively examines the high benefit to cost ratios across three potential 
cross border links within the SAR: India-Sri Lanka, India-Bhutan and India-Nepal. The major sources 
of benefit are avoiding unserved energy, operational cost benefits and capacity benefits, when 
measured using an investment planning and optimisation model. These benefits are $1.8bn p.a., 
against one-off transmission line costs of $700m. Chattopadhyay does not discuss the distributional 
impacts and why the links are not already built if they are really so beneficial. Clearly if such large 
potential gains exist it would be worth understanding what barriers stand in the way of electricity 
trade across the SAR and how they can be overcome. The measured benefits in the SEM and PJM 
cases were significantly less attractive than this (proportionally), but are in the process of being 
realised, in the light of the prescriptions for successful power pool development outlined above. 
 
Taken together ESMAP (2008) and Chattopadhyay (2013) identify considerable potential for regional 
electricity trading, much of it unexploited, and only at the feasibility study stage. 
 
Suggestions for further research 
 
There is much we do not know about the promotion of international electricity trade. While the 
empirical literature has extensively examined the impact of electricity liberalisation on electricity 
market outcomes (see Pollitt, 2012b, for a review of the literature), there has been relatively little 
examination of either how international electricity trade can be promoted or the impact of trade. 
There has been some work on the impact of market extension within the US, but outside the US the 
work is almost entirely at the level of impact studies of the potential for trade. What is required is 
work looking at actual market evolution and impact. 
 
 
 
36 Source of recent electricity production, import and export figures: CIA The World Factbook. Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
37 See: http://www.sari-energy.org/ 
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A number of interesting areas for future econometric work suggest themselves. 
 
First, what explains the extent of involvement in international trade? We have described the 
evolution of six power trading arrangements that took years to develop. Can we explain the extent of 
trade with reference to opportunity, national institutional variables, membership of a free trade 
area, institutions of the international electricity market, international financial support etc? Taking a 
sample of countries over time, this analysis would draw on the New Institutional Economics 
literature (in line with Erdogdu’s (2013) analysis of national progress with electricity reform). Nord 
Pool evolved steadily (and reasonably quickly) from its starting point in Norway. WAPP has taken 
decades to get going, while SIEPAC has finally completed its major transmission line (more than 25 
years after its initial feasibility study). Distinguishing the relative impact of trade potential and 
institutional arrangements would seem to be worthwhile. 
 
Second, what price or quality of service impact does international trade in electricity actually have? 
These impacts could be on national electricity price levels or volatility, power shortages etc. Trade 
should have an impact in bringing about price convergence (following Mansur and White, 2009, on 
PJM extension). It might also mitigate domestic power shocks (such as hydro shortages, or a major 
power plant outage). It might relieve shortages of electricity (or allow domestic market extension to 
more customers). Econometric analysis of national wholesale or industrial prices, could be linked 
within trade involvement variables to see the extent to which international power trading has 
demonstrable national impacts. Clearly, small amounts of power trading might be enough to cause 
significant price convergence between neighbouring countries. Such analysis could focus on particular 
institutional developments within power pools. For example, SAPP has existed for many years and 
has shown significant institutional development. One could look at the impact of the move from 
bilateral trading only to a Day ahead Market. 
 
Third, what is the productive efficiency impact of electricity trade? The merit order within a trading 
region is significantly altered when the market moves from being national to being international. 
Following, Douglas (2006, on US coal fired power plants), the efficiency of power plant utilisation 
after the introduction of a power pool can be examined (e.g. within SAPP or SIEPAC). It would also 
be possible to examine the extent to which international trade impacted the efficiency of individual 
power plants, in a way similar to the impact of privatisation or liberalisation more generally. 
Alternatively, the impact of involvement in a power pool on the promotion of electricity productivity 
could be examined, at the plant or utility level. For instance, Estache et al. (2008) and Jaunky (2013) 
look at utility level productivity evolution within SAPP. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that it would be good to see more careful cost-benefit analyses of the actual 
outturn performance of power pools in order to see if the potential initially identified is being 
realised. SIEPAC and SEM were both undertaken following positive cost benefit analyses: it would be 
highly informative to undertake actual cost benefit analyses (following Newbery and Pollitt, 1997) of 
their realisation in order to quantify the outturn impacts of these developments. 
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APPENDIX 1:  Cross-Border Trading in Selected Countries by Power Pool 
 
 
 
The table below shows the proportion of cross-border electricity trades to interconnector capacity 
(transmission capacity) and total electricity consumption in some selected countries across various 
Power Pools. Data on annual electricity consumption and trades were converted from kWh to MW 
for them to be in the same unit as interconnector capacity. Conversion was done by dividing the 
annual data on each variable in kWh by 1000*24*365. The results as reported in the table indicate 
that a lot of trades take place in Nord Pool and in SAPP than in the other power pools. For instance, 
while the interconnection capacity utilisation are respectively 39% and 50% for Nord Pool and SAPP, 
WAPP and SIEPAC records just approximately 9% and 4% respectively. Similarly, the proportions of 
cross-border trades in consumption are 28% and 21% for Nord Pool and SAPP respectively, whereas 
WAPP and SIEPAC trade only 5% and 2% of their consumption. It is worth noticing that while SAPP 
appeared to have utilised its transmission capacity (50%) more than the Nord Pool (39%), Nord Pool 
has traded more of its consumption (28%) than the SAPP (21%). 
 
The performance of SAPP does stand out relative to other developing countries’ power pools. The 
reason for SAPP to have achieved so much might be because of the (excess) existing capacity in 
South Africa which makes trading possible. Unlike the WAPP whose installed capacity stood at only 
9,705MW as at the time it was formally created, Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) installed 
capacity at inception in 1995 was 48,461 MW, with about 38,000 MW in South Africa alone. Similarly, 
SAPP had been created many years before other pools in developing countries - e.g. WAPP was 
established in 2000/2001. Those years of existence might have been used to develop the pool – 
development and upgrading of transmission networks, etc, in order to promote trading within the 
pool. 
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Table A1: Share (%) of Trade in Electricity Consumption and Transmission Capacity in Selected Countries by Pool 
 
Selected 
Country 
Transmission 
cap. (MW) 
Installed 
cap 
(MW) 
Electricity 
consp 
(MW) 
Exports 
(MW) 
Imports 
(MW) 
Crossborder 
trade (MW) 
Trade % of 
transmision 
cap. 
Trade 
% of 
consp 
Nord Pool         
Norway 5395 30180 14703.2 1,974 390 2,363 43.8 16.1 
Sweden 11825 36510 15353.9 1,679 1,455 3,135 26.5 20.4 
Finland 3310 16680 9960.0 381 1,839 2,220 67.1 22.3 
Denmark 6405 13710 3915.5 1,297 1,463 2,760 43.1 70.5 
Estonia 1941 2751 877.4 264 156 420 21.6 47.9 
Latvia 2084 2166 778.8 242 530 772 37.1 99.2 
Lithuania 2714 3820 1097.3 754 645 1,399 51.5 127.5 
Total 33674 105817 46686.1 6,591 6,479 13,070 38.8 28.0 
West African Power Pool (WAPP) 
Ghana 627 1985 650.9 28.4 49.7 78.1 12.5 12.0 
Nigeria 855 5900 2192.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Senegal 100 638 158.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cote d'Ivoire 327 1222 368.8 88.1 0.0 88.1 27.0 23.9 
Total 1909 9745 3370.7 116.6 49.7 166.2 8.7 4.9 
Central American Power Market (SIEPAC) 
Guatemala 300 2745 812.2 15.1 0.9 16.0 5.3 2.0 
El Salvador 300 1491 533.8 0.8 4.3 5.1 1.7 1.0 
Honduras 300 1701 536.1 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.3 
Nicaragua 300 1108 293.3 0.0 7.3 7.3 2.4 2.5 
Costa Rica 300 2800 920.5 8.8 23.2 32.0 10.7 3.5 
Panama 300 1976 590.2 14.3 1.0 15.3 5.1 2.6 
Total 1800 11821 3686.1 38.9 38.1 77.0 4.3 2.1 
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) 
DRC 260 2437 684.6 218.7 0.7 219.4 84.4 32.0 
Zambia 1400 1679 1008.9 30.6 25.3 55.9 4.0 5.5 
Mozambique 5800 2428 1159.8 1,349.3 945.0 2,294.3 39.6 197.8 
Botswana 1450 132 302.3 0.0 249.0 249.0 17.2 82.4 
South Africa 2050 44260 24554.8 1,616.4 1,206.6 2,823.1 137.7 11.5 
Lesotho 230 76 35.1 0.0 28.2 28.2 12.3 80.5 
Namibia 750 508 415.0 10.4 287.6 298.0 39.7 71.8 
Total 11940 51520 28160.4 3,225.5 2,742.4 5,967.8 50.0 21.2 
 
Data Sources: CIA: The World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/index.html 
International Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA (2013) WEST AFRICAN POWER POOL: Planning and 
Prospects for Renewable 
Energy. http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/WAPP.pdf 
International Renewable Energy Agency, IRENA (2013) SOUTHERN AFRICAN POWER POOL: Planning 
and Prospects for Renewable 
Energy. http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/SAPP.pdf 
